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Abstract 
 
Analysis of an original, broad, internet-based survey reveals that debt holding is related to three aspects of 
time discounting: (i) present bias, measured by the degree of declining impatience in the generalized 
hyperbolic discount function; (ii) borrowing aversion, captured by a sign effect - discounting future losses 
at a lower rate than future gains; and (iii) impatience, measured by the overall discount rate. Present-biased 
respondents are classified as naïve if their answers reveal them to be time-inconsistent procrastinators, and 
classified as sophisticated otherwise. Naïve respondents with more steeply declining impatience are more 
likely to be debtors, and are likely to have larger amounts of debt, whereas sophisticates display only 
insignificant positive association between declining impatience and debt holding. Responses indicative of a 
sign effect are negatively associated with debt holding. The marginal effect on debt of such a sign effect is 
larger in magnitude than the effect of one standard deviation increases both in declining impatience and in 
impatience. Survey responses indicative of high or declining impatience are associated with high 
debt-to-income ratios, borrowing on credit cards, and the experiences of having borrowed unsecured 
consumer loans, of having engaged in debt-restructuring, or of having declared personal bankruptcy. 
 
KEYWORDS: Debt; hyperbolic discounting; sign effect; naive; internet survey. 
JEL Classification: D91, D14, D03.    
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1. Introduction 
 
We conduct an original nationwide internet survey of Japanese adults to empirically examine how debt 
behavior is related to personal time discounting. Our focus is on the association between debt behavior and 
three aspects of personal time discounting: (i) hyperbolic discounting or declining impatience, where a 
person is less patient in immediate future choices than in distant future choices (e.g., Thaler, 1981; Benzion 
et al., 1989; and Kinari et al., 2009); (ii) the sign effect, where a person discounts positive payoffs more 
intensely than negative payoffs (e.g., Khwaja et al. 2007; and Ikeda et al., 2010); and (iii) impatience, 
measured by the overall discount rate. In the internet survey, we ask respondents four hypothetical 
questions regarding intertemporal choices, which enables us to detect each respondent`s time discounting 
biases, and to precisely infer each`s degree of impatience. We also ask detailed questions about their debt 
holdings, their credit history, and their economic status. 
    Intertemporal choice theory predicts that time discounting affects borrowing through three channels. 
In the classic microeconomic framework, impatience, measured by time preference, is an important 
determinant of consumers' saving and borrowing (e.g., Fisher, 1930). In the more recently developed 
behavioral economics framework, hyperbolic discounting (or declining impatience) and the resulting 
self-control problem are predicted to cause overconsumption, undersaving and overborrowing (e.g., 
Laibson, 1996, 1997; Krusell et al., 2002; Laibson et al., 2003, 2007). Also the behavioral economics 
predicts that gain-loss asymmetry in time discounting, captured by the sign effect, makes consumers averse 
to intertemporal trades, and hence leads to "borrowing aversion" (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). In sum, 
theory predicts that indebtedness has positive association with hyperbolic discounting and impatience and 
negative association with the sign effect. Although the theoretical predictions are logical and testable, there 
have been few attempts at direct empirical confirmation. 
    The contribution of our research is to directly and systematically measure associations between time 
discounting and borrowing behavior. In so doing, we add three novelties. First, we specify the discount 
factor in the form of a "generalized hyperbolic discount function" (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992), which 
is characterized by two parameters. One parameter indicates the degree of hyperbolic deviation from 
exponential discounting (α) and the other determines the intercept (η). We adduce the two parameters for 
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each individual from responses to hypothetical questions regarding immediate future choices and distant 
future choices. Each individual's α value measures his degree of declining impatience. We find that this 
measure is associated with debt behavior in the way predicted. The inferred individual values of parameter 
η are combined with other discount rates to construct each's degree of impatience. 
    Second, we distinguish the naïve, who do not expect that as time passes their impatience for given 
points in the future is going to rise, and the sophisticated, who correctly anticipate the future incidence of 
their own preference reversals and behave consistently with what their future impatient "selves" would do. 
Theory predicts that naïve hyperbolically discounting consumers display time-inconsistent overborrowing, 
whereas sophisticated people may somehow forestall their own undesirable inclination to overborrow.1 To 
examine the validity of the theoretical predictions, we ask respondents two questions regarding their 
behavioral tendencies. The one is how likely they were in fact to procrastinate by putting off doing onerous 
homework assignments during vacations in their school days. The other is how late they planned to do the 
same homework assignments at that time. Using the response data, we divide hyperbolic respondents into 
naïve ones, who self-reported unplanned procrastination, and sophisticated ones, who did not. We show 
how the effect of hyperbolic discounting on debt holdings depends on whether the respondent is naïve or 
sophisticated. 
    Third, we examine association between time discounting and inclination toward overborrowing, 
which is revealed by high debt-to-income ratios, borrowing on credit cards, and the experiences of having 
borrowed unsecured consumer loans, of having being denied a loan, of having engaged in 
debt-restructuring, or of having declared personal bankruptcy. 
    We first find that, for the naïve respondents, both debt holding and overborrowing inclination are 
associated positively with the degree of declining impatience. For example, for the naïve respondents, an 
increase in the degree of declining impatience by one standard deviation leads to: a 3.6 percentage-point 
higher probability of being a debtor; a 2.1 percentage-point higher probability of having credit-card debts; 
                                                  
1 See, e.g., Phelps and Pollack (1968), O'Donophue and Rabin (1999), and Heidhue and Kőszegi (2010). 
As noted by these theoretical works, however, being sophisticated can affect saving and borrowing in 
either direction, i.e., it can either mitigate or exaggerate the undersaving and overborrowing problems that 
naïve people would face. 
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and a JPY0.10 million (USD1,233) larger debt amount. Notably, the marginal effect on the likelihood of 
having credit card debts is not that small compared with the prevalence rate of credit-card debtors in the 
sample (8.6%). In contrast, the sample of the sophisticated respondents displays only insignificant positive 
association between declining impatience and borrowing. This implies that being sophisticated 
significantly weakens the positive association between declining impatience and debt holding. 
    We also find that borrowing aversion, revealed by the incidence of the sign effect, negatively relates 
to actual debt holding, as predicted by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). The probability of respondents who 
are subject to the sign effect being indebted is 6.1 percentage-points lower than the corresponding 
probability for those who are not subject to the effect. The marginal effect of the presence of the sign effect 
on the respondents' debt amount is JPY0.24 million (USD2,959). These marginal effects of the presence of 
the sign effect are all larger than the marginal effect of a one-standard-deviation increase both in the degree 
of declining impatience and in the degree of impatience. 
    The degree of impatience, measured by the discount rate, positively relates not only to debt holding 
but also to overborrowing inclination. A one-standard-deviation increase in impatience leads to: a 5.4 
percentage-point higher probability of being a debtor; a JPY0.18 million (USD2,219) larger amount of 
debt; and a 2.2 percentage-point higher probability of having credit card debts. 
    The robustness of the regression results are checked in two ways. First, regressions are re-conducted 
by using for a regressor the present bias dummy, instead of the degree of declining impatience. Second, to 
rule out the possibility that our results simply reflect that responses indicative of present bias or high 
discount rates are a consequence of overborrowing rather than the cause of it, we re-estimate debt 
equations by excluding from the sample any respondent with a credit problem or a troubled credit history. 
Our results are robust against these considerations. 
    This research relates to the previous literature as follows. By calibration, Angeletos et al. (2001) and 
Laibson et al. (2003) show that the model of hyperbolic discounting consumers has the potential of 
resolving "the debt puzzle" that over 60% of US households are borrowing on credit cards. Using micro 
data provided by payday lenders, Skiba and Tobacman (2008) analyze the behavior of payday-loan 
borrowers by Method of Simulated Moments to accept partially-naïve hyperbolic-discounting models. 
These studies successfully present indirect evidence that hyperbolic discounting relates to (over)borrowing. 
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The evidence, however, is not based on micro data of personal discount rates. 
    Meier and Sprenger (2010) report that debt levels on revolving accounts have positive correlation 
with present bias. The study is important especially because they match credit bureau data of actual debt 
holding and the discount-rate data elicited using choice experiments. Our debt data are self-reported and 
thus possibly contain under-reporting bias. Nevertheless, if we detect positive correlation between present 
bias (or declining impatience) and debt, true association can be regarded as also positive insofar as the 
underreporting of debt is not negatively correlated with the present bias. Although our study is similar in 
spirit to Meier and Sprenger's, we add new insights by controlling for whether the respondents are naïve or 
sophisticated and by incorporating the degree of declining impatience and the sign effect.2 
    The sign effect has been shown to relate negatively to smoking (Khwaja et al., 2007; and Kang and 
Ikeda, 2011) and to obesity (Ikeda et al. 2010). Although Ikeda et al. (2010) also report negative 
association between the incidence of the sign effect and debt holding, neither hyperbolic discounting nor 
sophistication is controlled for in the regression analysis. 
    Our way of identifying the naïve and the sophisticated is similar to that of Wong (2008). He identifies 
whether in his class on macroeconomics are subject to the self-control problem and how naïve the students 
with self-control problem might be by asking them three questions: (i) when they should ideally start 
                                                  
2 See also Ottaviani and Vandone (2011), which reports significant associations between impulsivity and 
unsecured debt holding. A similar association to theirs is detected for here in an economic model with 
present bias and other discounting factors. By estimating a simple hyperbolic discount function from a 
laboratory task experiment, Chabris et al. (2009) show that individuals' elicited "discount rates" predict 
inter-individual variations in various field behaviors, including credit-card debt holding. However, their 
focus is not on debt but rather on health-related behaviors. They do not distinguish the overall discount rate 
and present bias nor control for the degree of naiveté or for the sign effect. Tsutsui et al. (2007) discussed 
on associations between time discounting and debt behavior using cross-section data. Using panel survey 
data, Ikeda et al. (2010) show that the effect on debt holding of an exogenous reduction in the usury cap, 
which was brought about by Japan's supreme-court decision in 2009, depends on the debtor's 
procrastinating tendency, a proxy of present bias. See also Tanaka and Murooka (2010), which provides a 
comprehensive survey on consumption-saving decisions under the self control problem. 
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midterm preparation; (ii) knowing themselves, when they themselves predict to start it, whatever the ideal 
action may be; and (iii) when they actually did start it. By matching these self-reported data to the students' 
actual grades, he shows that the time inconsistency problem and naiveté negatively affect both actual class 
performance and final grade. By applying this simple idea, where our couple of questions on when to do 
onerous homework assignments can be regarded as corresponding to Wong's questions (ii) and (iii), we 
work out differences in borrowing behavior between naïve respondents and sophisticated ones. 
    The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical relation between time 
discounting and debt holding behavior is briefly discussed. Section 3 explains the data. Section 4 shows 
the regression results. Section 5 checks the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Time discounting and debt holding behavior 
 
When we make intertemporal consumption decisions, the subjective discount rate or time preference, as a 
measure of impatience, plays a key role in determining how much resource is consumed for present 
gratifications, and saved for future gratifications. We hypothesize that debt holding is, in part, related to 
time discounting. To detect for the association between time discounting and debt holding, we focus on 
three aspects of time discounting: (i) hyperbolic discounting, (ii) the sign effect, and (iii) impatience. In 
this section, we first demonstrate theoretical backgrounds of our empirical analysis. 
 
2.1. Hyperbolic discounting and impatience 
 
Consider consumers whose discount factor for future felicity with delay τ is given by the generalized 
hyperbolic discount function ƒ(τ): 
0,0,0,)1(),;( ≥≥≥+= − ηατατηατ ηf                      (1) 
The discount rate ρ, which is obtained by computing -ƒ'(τ)/ƒ (τ), is given as: 
ατ
αηηατρ
+
=
1
),;(                                  (2) 
       In (2), three points are noteworthy. First of all, the discount rate is declining in delay τ, which 
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represents the usual property (e.g., Ainslie, 2001; and Benzion et al., 1989) of hyperbolic discounters that 
they are less patient in immediate future choices than in distant future choices. Secondly, the degree of 
declining impatience is higher as α is larger. Especially, for two distinct delays τ1 and τ2 (τ1>τ2), the relative 
discount rates ρ(τ₁)/ρ(τ₂)(=(1+ατ2)/(1+ατ1)), which are smaller than one, depends solely on α: a large α 
implies a small ρ(τ₁)/ρ(τ₂). We thus refer to α as the degree of declining impatience. Thirdly, the discount 
rate equals αη when τ=0, which implies that, for given α, η determines the discount rate for infinitesimally 
short horizon. For given α and τ, the discount rate ρ has the same information as η. To ease interpretation, 
and from the data availability, we focus on the relationship of debt behavior and (α, ρ), rather than (α, η). 
The discount factor depends negatively on both declining impatience α and impatience ρ.3 The positive 
association between impatience and debt holding follows from the standard theory of intertemporal choice 
(e.g., Fisher, 1930). 
    As for the effect of declining impatience, we should consider whether the hyperbolic discounter is a 
naïve person, who do not expect that, as time passes, their impatience is going to rise, and hence that the 
preference reversal will take place, or a sophisticated one, who expects correctly the future incidence of the 
preference reversal and behaves consistently with what future impatient "selves" would do (see, 
O'Donophue and Rabin, 1999). 
    With declining impatience, hyperbolic discounters face a self-control problem: "selves" in different 
points in time always have weaker preferences toward immediate savings than they would have toward 
future savings. When they are naïve, the declining impatience causes overconsumption, undersaving, and 
overborrowing in a time-inconsistent way. Thus, for naïve hyperbolic discounters, debt holdings are 
expected to depend positively on the degree of declining impatience (α). 
    When hyperbolic discounters are sophisticated, it may be plausible to hypothesize that the positive 
effect of declining impatience on undersaving and overborrowing becomes somewhat weaker than it would 
be if they were naïve. It is true firstly because, if the agent is sufficiently risk-averse, the present "self" has 
                                                  
3 When we rewrite ƒ(τ; α, η) as F(τ, α, ρ(τ; α, η)), the discount factor F satisfies ∂F(τ, α, ρ)/ ∂τ=ƒτ<0,  
∂F(τ, α, ρ)/ ∂α=ƒα<0, and ∂F(τ, α, ρ)/ ∂ρ=((1+ατ)/α)ƒη<0. 
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a saving incentive for future selves as to retain their consumption levels.4 Secondly, sophisticates have an 
incentive to commit to his lifetime consumption plan by using some devices (e.g., illiquidity assets, 
savings accounts, 401(k), not using credit cards, etc.). In that case, they can prevent future selves from 
overconsuming and overborrowing due to the preference reversal (see Laibson, 1995; Sourdin, 2008).5 
    In sum, we hypothesize the followings regarding the relationships between the debt holding behavior 
and (α, ρ): 
 
 H1 The degree of impatience, measured by the discount rate ρ, positively relates to debt holding. 
 H2 For naïve respondents, the degree of declining impatience, measured by α, positively relates to debt 
holding and overborrowing inclination. 
 H3 For sophisticated respondents, positive association between the degree of declining impatience and 
debt holding is somewhat weaker than for the naïve. 
 
2.2. The sign effect 
 
Behavioral economists have reported that losses are discounted at a lower rate than gains. For example, 
Thaler (1981) elicited discount rates for gains that were three to ten times higher than those for losses. 
Several of his subjects revealed negative discount rates for loss, which implying that an immediate loss is 
preferred to a delayed loss of the same value. Loewenstein (1988) reported that, for his subjects, receiving 
USD 100 today was indifferent to receiving USD 157 in a year, whereas loosing USD 100 immediately 
was indifferent to USD 133. This prevalent gain-loss asymmetry is referred to as the sign effect (Frederick, 
                                                  
4 In the literature (e.g., Phelps and Pollack, 1968; and O'Donophue and Rabin, 1999), it is known that 
being sophisticated, rather than naïve, mitigates the self-control problem and undersaving if the utility 
function is more concave than the log utility. As is known in the empirical studies on the equility premium 
puzzle, actual estimates of the relative risk aversion parameter are usually much higher than one. Being 
sophisticated is thus considered to mitigate, rather than exaggerate, the undersaving behavior of the naïve. 
5 In Appendix A, consumption/borrowing behavior of the naïve and the sophisticated under generalized 
hyperbolic discounting are discussed formally by using a three-period model. 
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et al., 2002). 
    With the sign effect, people are reluctant to intertemporal trade-offs, which causes aversion to both 
lending, i.e., giving up a part of present consumption for future consumption, and borrowing, i.e., giving 
up a part of future consumption for present consumption. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) show analytically 
the property by using a "temporal prospect" model. We hypothesize that respondents whose time 
preferences display the sign effect are likely to hold smaller debt.6 
 
 H4 The incidence of the sign effect negatively relates to debt holding and overborrowing. 
 
3. The data 
 
Our empirical research is based on our original nationwide internet survey, titled as the Japan Internet 
Survey on Preferences Relating to Time and Risk 2010 (hereafter JPTR 2010). Nikkei Research, Inc., a 
representative Japanese private research company, which deals with economic surveys to construct 
database for academic and non-academic purposes, carried out the survey during October 21 to 27, 2010, 
by using questionnaires that we prepared. The respondents were 2387 Japanese people between the ages of 
20 and 65, who had been enrolled in the Nikkei Research Access Panel, which was composed totally of 
                                                  
6 The temporal prospect model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) describes choices among sequences of 
dated adjustments to consumption, rather than the entire lifetime utility maximization problem. Although 
there is no theoretical discussions on the issue, one simple way to incorporate the sign effect into the entire 
lifetime utility maximization problem is to assume that there is an exogenous reference consumption 
level c͞ and to specify the discount factor for period utility u(cτ - ͞c ) with delay τ, u(cτ- ͞c ), as 
)()1()( τθτ fkg += , 
where, with θ denoting a binary indicator which takes one for cτ < ͞c and zero otherwise, k(>0) represents 
the sign effect, which weakens time discounting when cτ is smaller than the reference level ͞c ; and ƒ(τ) is 
the discount factor in (1). When ͞c < current total income yτ, cτ < ͞c implies cτ < yτ and hence borrowing cτ-yτ 
is positive. It follows that consumers apply lower discount rates when choosing how much to borrow. 
10 
 
about 155,000 registrants.7 Cash voucher are provided as incentives by lottery to respondents. The sample 
was selected by stratified random sampling such that the age and sex distribution is as close as possible to 
that of the Japanese census. We included various questions in the survey to elicit information about: the 
respondents' preferences regarding time discounting and risk aversion; 8  their economic attributes, 
including debt holding behavior, income, and asset holding; and demographic and social attributes. 
    The summary statistics of background attributes of the respondents are listed in panel A of Table 1. 
Males occupied 49.9% of the respondents with the average age of 41.8. 
 
Insert Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
3.1. Debt 
 
In JPTR 2010, we asked respondents to indicate how much they had debt other than mortgages by 
choosing one of nine ranges, from (1) "no debt" to (9) "more than JPY 10 million." To construct the data of 
debt amounts, we assign median to each of the nine individual ranges that the respondents chose.9 As seen 
from panel B of Table 1, around a 20.2% of the respondents have debts, the average of which amounts to 
JPY 2.45 million (converted to around USD 30,265 by the average yen/dollar rate (81.1) in October 
2011).10 
                                                  
7 During the survey period of October 21 to 27, 2010, 11,090 registrants were notified about the survey by 
e-mail. During October 5 to 12, 2010, we conducted a pre-survey, in which 177 responses were collected 
from 902 samples sent. The sample of the pre-survey was excluded from the main survey. 
8 To elicit the degree of risk aversion, we asked respondents to make sequential three binary choices, as in 
Figure A1 of Appendix B for discount rates, on whether they buy lottery "A" that gives JPY100,000 
(USD1233) with probability 0.5 at given prices, specified as JPY10 to JPY50,000. 
9 As for the highest range (9): "more than JPY 10 million", we simply take it as [JPY 10 million, 12.5 
million), where the width of JPY 2.5 million is determined such that it equals to the width of the range of 
(8): [JPY 7.5 million, JPY 10 million). 
10 Hereafter we use the conversion rate (81.1 JPY/USD) when converting JPY values into USD values. 
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    We also asked the respondents with debts to indicate for what purposes they borrowed, from seven 
options (multiple responses are allowed): (i) purchasing cars; (ii) purchasing other goods; (iii) financing 
living costs; (iv) financing business activities, (v) financing amusements, (vi) paying off other debts; and 
(vii) others. Debts for cars (6.6%), other goods (8.0%), and living costs (4.1%) are relatively frequent 
among the seven (see panel B of Table 1). 
    To quantify the respondents' inclination toward overborrowing, we construct an excess debt indicator 
which equals one if the debt amount held is larger than 30% of annual household income, and zero 
otherwise.11 As seen in panel B of Table 1, excess borrowers in this sense amount to 8.1 % in the sample. 
Besides, we asked all the respondents: (i) whether or not they have credit-card debt including debt on a 
revolving-payment account; (ii) whether or not they have ever borrowed unsecured consumer loans; (iii) 
whether or not they have ever been denied a loan for whatever reason; and (iv) whether or not they have 
ever engaged in (out-of-court) debt-restructuring, or declared personal bankruptcy. 
    As seen from the table, credit-card debtors occupy only 8.6% in the sample, which is much smaller 
than in the U.S. case. For example, based on the actual credit report data from the U.S. credit bureaus, 
Meier and Sprenger (2010) report that 41% of their 541 respondents have credit-card debts on revolving 
accounts. Similarly, the rate of respondents who have ever borrowed unsecured consumer loans (8.7%) and 
that of respondents who have experienced debt-restructuring or personal bankruptcy (2.1%) are not high. 
As conjectured from the finding of Karlan and Zinman (2006) that nearly a half of their respondents 
underreported borrowing of high interest consumer loans, our self-reported data may contain 
underreporting bias. Notwithstanding the concerns about possible self-reporting bias, we shall use the 
self-reported data because of limited data availability. This may be a limit of our empirical study. But note 
that if we detect positive association between present bias (or impatience) and debt, then actual association 
can also be taken as positive so long as underreporting of debt is not negatively associated with present 
bias (or impatience).12 
                                                  
11 In June, 2010, the Japanese government revised the Money Lending Business Control Law to ban 
individuals from newly borrowing when the outstanding amounts of their debts exceed one third of their 
annual income. 
12 To see this, suppose first that underreporting of debt is independent of time discounting. Then, 
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3.2. Time discounting 
 
In the survey, we try to elicit the respondents' time discounting using four questions on intertemporal 
choice: two (Q1 and Q2) are designed to detect the degree of declining impatience (α); and the other two 
(Q5 and Q6) are to detect the incidence of the sign effect (θ). We also measured the degree of impatience 
(ρ) from their responses to the four questions. 
    As noted in the literature (e.g., Frederick et al., 2002; and Anderson et al., 2008), the discount rate 
will be overestimated unless the effect of the curvature (risk aversion) of the utility function is controlled. 
Nevertheless, to make it easier to calculate the parameters of the generalized hyperbolic discount function, 
we do not control for the effect of risk aversion in eliciting the personal discount rates. Instead, we cope 
with the problem in two ways. First, when estimating association between time discounting and debt by 
regression, we incorporate as a control variable the degree of risk aversion which is inferred from 
responses to a query on risky choice. Then, the estimated coefficients of time discounting variables 
represent partial correlation after controlling for the effects of risk aversion both on time discounting and 
on debt. Secondly, we will also conduct regression later by using for a regressor the binary indicator for 
present bias (α>0), instead of the degree of declining impatience (α) itself. As the value of the binary 
indicator for present bias is not affected by the degree of risk aversion (see Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2006), 
the reexamination would work as a robustness check. 
 
3.2.1. Declining impatience 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
estimated association, if detected, between time discounting and debt behavior can be taken as the 
unbiased estimate of true association. Next, suppose instead that underreporting of debt is positively 
associated with present bias, i.e., that hyperbolic respondents are more likely to underreport debt than 
exponential ones. Then association between present bias and debt would be underestimated (or 
overestimated) if true association is positive (or negative). Therefore, if positive association is detected 
from the self-reported data, it implies that true association is also positive. 
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Questions Q1 and Q2 consist of sequential three binary decisions on immediate future trade-offs and of 
distant future trade-offs, respectively. As illustrated in Appendix B, in Q1, respondents are asked to choose 
between: (A) getting JPY 1,000 (around USD 12.3) today; and (B) getting JPY 1,000 plus a certain amount 
a week later; whereas in Q2 the options are: (A) getting JPY 1,000 a year later; and (B) getting JPY 1,000 
plus a certain amount a year plus one week later. Let XQ1 and XQ2 be the delayed money amounts in Q1 and 
Q2, respectively, which are taken as subjectively equivalent to JPY 1,000 in options (A). Then, the degree 
of declining impatience α in (1) is obtained by solving jointly 
 
        1000  =  XQ1 ƒ(7, α, η), 
1000 ƒ(365, α, η)  =  XQ2 ƒ(372, α, η), 
 
which are combined to a non-linear equation of α, 
)3721ln()3651ln(
)71ln(
)ln()1000ln(
)ln()1000ln(
2
1
αα
α
+−+
+
=
−
−
Q
Q
X
X
. 
    In Table 2, panel A summarizes elicited parameters which characterize the generalized hyperbolic 
discount function. Note that a positive α implies declining impatience or present biased preferences. The 
sample mean of α equals 0.018, which differs significantly from zero (p<0.00). The average respondents 
are thus present biased (α>0). A 40.1% (N=960) of the 2386 respondents are present-biased (see Table 3 
below).13 
 
Insert Table 2. 
 
    By substituting the sample mean of (α, η) into (2), Figure 1 illustrates the discount rates of the average 
respondent, the average debtor, and the average non-debtor, as decreasing functions of delay τ. As is also 
shown in panel A of Table 2, the debtor's discount rate schedule is characterized by its stronger concavity 
                                                  
13 The rate of present biased respondents is comparable with that which Meier and Sprenger (2010) 
estimate for the US sample (36%), and is somewhat higher than that which Eisenhauer and Ventura (2006) 
report (22.8% for the Italian sample and 18.4% for the Dutch sample). 
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(i.e., a larger α) and higher intercept (i.e., a larger αη). 
 
Insert Figure 1. 
 
3.2.2. Naïve or sophisticated 
 
To identify whether each of the hyperbolic respondents is naïve or sophisticated, we asked two queries Q3 
and Q4 as to: (i) how early used to do homework assignments during school vacation; and (ii) how early to 
finish up homework assignments used to plan during school vacation, respectively: 
 
Q3 Thinking about when you were a child and you were given an assignment during school 
vacation, how early did you usually finish up the assignment? (X ONE Box) 
1   Got it done right away. 
2   Tended to get it done early, before the due date. 
3   Worked on it daily up until the due date. 
4   Tended to get it done toward the end. 
5   Got it done at the last minute. 
 
Q4 Thinking about when you were a child and you were given an assignment during school 
vacation, how early to finish up did you plan for the assignment? (X ONE Box) 
1   I planned to get it done right away. 
2   I planned to get it done rather early, before the due date. 
3   I planned to work on it daily up until the due date. 
4   I planned to get it done rather toward the end. 
5   I planned to get it done at the last minute. 
6   I didn't make any plans. 
 
    After excluding 109 hyperbolic respondents who did not make any plans (i.e., who chose "6" in Q4) 
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from the sample, we take present-biased respondents (i.e., those with α>0) who chose a larger number in 
Q3 than in Q4 as being naïve, because they could be regarded as those who were not cognizant of their 
self-control problem and tended to procrastinate onerous jobs in a time-inconsistent way. The other 
respondents, who are non-hyperbolic (α≤0) or did choose a weakly smaller number in Q3 than in Q4, are 
identified as being sophisticated. The naïve (N=576) occupy 60.0% of 960 hyperbolic respondents who 
used to make plans over performing assignments.14 
 
3.2.3. The sign effect 
 
To detect the sign effect, we elicit the discount rates for future receipts and future payments by asking 
queries Q5 and Q6, respectively. In doing so, we follow the literature (e.g., Harrison et al., 2002) in asking 
respondents to make nine of binary decisions in each of two payoff tables, where the money amounts with 
front-end delay are commonly set to JPY 1 million (around USD 12,330). See Appendix C for the payoff 
table of Q6. 
    As summarized in panel B of Table 2, the sample mean of the discount rates for future receipt, elicited 
from Q5, is 8.8%, whereas that of the discount rates for future payments, elicited from Q6, is 0.1%. The 
difference of the two means is highly significant (p<0.000). The average respondent thus displays the sign 
effect. The proportion of the respondents who exhibited the sign effect (N=1859) amounts to 81.1%. 
 
3.2.4. Impatience 
 
We quantify each respondent's degree of impatience by taking the standardized average of the four 
                                                  
14 The proportion of the naïve might be underestimated because in Q4 and Q5 the respondents might 
self-report their past behavior as more rational and time-consistent than it actually were. For example, the 
proportion of the naïve is comparable with, but somewhat smaller than, what Wong (2008) shows by 
conducting a field survey in the university class on macroeconomics. In his sample, naïve subjects occupy 
86.4% of the students with the time-inconsistency problem in actual midterm preparation. See also Hey 
and Lotito (2009), which estimates by conducting experiments.that 50% of their subjects are naïve. 
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discount rates that are implied from queries Q1, Q2, Q5, and Q6: Two are discount rates for τ=7 and 372 
elicited from Q1 and Q2, i.e., ρ(7) and ρ(372) computed from (2); and the other two are the discount rates 
for future receipts and payments implied from Q5 and Q6.15 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Means in stratified sample 
 
Let us start with examining simple associations between time discounting and debt behavior. Panel B of 
Table 3 compares average debt behavior among respondents stratified by whether their impatience is 
declining (α>0) or not (α≤0); whether impatience ρ is higher than the average or not; and whether the sign 
effect is present (θ=1) or not (θ=0). The table shows that debt holding and time discounting are associated 
consistently with our hypotheses H1 to H4. First, naïve respondents with a positive α are more likely to be 
debtors and have larger amounts of debt than both sophisticated hyperbolic respondents and 
non-hyperbolic respondents. Both associations are significant. For example, in the sample of the naïve, the 
proportion of debtors is 23.8%, which is higher than 20.3% in the sample of the hyperbolically 
sophisticated and 18.1% in the non-hyperbolic sample. For all the overborrowing indices ("Debt-to-income 
ratio >30%" to "Having ever engaged in debt restructuring or declared personal bankruptcy"), respondents 
with overborrowing inclination occupy larger proportions in the naïve sample than both in the 
sophisticated sample and in the non-hyperbolic sample (α≤0). The associations are all significant. 
 
Insert Table 3. 
 
    Secondly, in all the cases, less patient respondents (ρ > mean) display stronger inclinations toward 
borrowing and overborrowing than the more patient. For example, the average debt amount of the high-ρ 
                                                  
15 Note that ρ(7) and ρ(372) are daily discount rates while the discount rates implied from Q5 and Q6 are 
expressed in annual rates. As we standardize the rates, this difference does not matter when computing the 
average of the four rates. 
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respondents (JPY 0.73 million) is around twice as large as that of the low-ρ respondents (JPY 0.37 million). 
In the sample of the high-ρ respondents, the proportion of the respondents who have the experience of 
having engaged in debt restructuring and/or declared personal personal bankruptcy (3.8%) is nearly three 
times as high as that in the low-ρ sample (1.3%). Except that the difference in average debt amounts 
between high- and low-respondents is insignificant for the debtor sample, the positive associations 
between (over)borrowing and impatience are significant. 
    Thirdly, the incidence of the sign effect is shown to be associated with borrowing aversion, as 
expected. For example, debtors occupy 18.9% in the sample with the sign effect, whereas they do 23.4% in 
the sample without the sign effect. However, the negative correlation between overborrowing and the sign 
effect is not valid except for "Debt-to-income ratio >30%". 
 
4.2. Regression results 
 
4.2.1. Debt holding 
 
To detect associations between debt holding behavior and each of three time-discounting variables (α, ρ, θ), 
we estimate models (A) and (B). In model (B), the product term of declining impatience (α) and the 
dummy variable for the naïve (DN) is added to the set of independent variables. In both models, control 
variables for other personal attributes are included. The controls include: (i) the degree of risk aversion; (ii) 
demographic factors, including age, gender, and education; and (iii) economic factors, including household 
income, household real asset holding, and household financial asset holding. 
    For example, letting Debtorί represent a binary indicator which equals one if the respondent ί is a 
debtor, and zero otherwise, we estimate the probability that respondent ί with time discounting attributes 
(αί, ρί, θί) and controlled attributes xί is a debtor by using probit models (A) and (B): 
⎩⎨
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where Φ represents the cumulative normal distribution. In the specification of model (B), with the product 
term αί∗DNί being added, coefficient βα captures correlation for sophisticated respondents between the 
for model (A), 
 
for model (B). 
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likelihood of being a debtor and αί, whereas the corresponding correlation for the naïve are given by βα+βN. 
    We also estimate the debt holding function by using debt amounts for the dependent variable. In so 
doing, the interval tobit regression model is estimated, because the debt amount data are right-censored at 
zero. 
    Panel A of Table 4 summarizes the marginal effects of increases in declining impatience (α), 
impatience (ρ), and the sign effect (θ) on the probability of being a debtor and on the amount of debt 
holding. As we shall explain below in order, we can confirm that our hypotheses H1 to H4 are supported at 
high significance levels. 
 
Insert Table 4. 
 
    As consistent with H1 and H2 (i.e., the hypotheses concerning associations between α and debt 
holding of the naïve/sophisticated), the results of model (B) show that, for naïve respondents, declining 
impatience has positive correlations with both the probability of being a debtor and the amounts of debt 
holding, whereas, for sophisticated respondents, the corresponding correlations are insignificant. Either for 
the probability of being a debtor or for the amounts of debt holding, associations between α and debt 
holding differ between the naïve and sophisticated respondents at the 10% significance level (not listed in 
the table). Quantitatively, for naïve respondents, an increase in α by one unit of standard deviation (0.046) 
leads to: (i) a 3.6 percentage-point (=0.046∗0.780) higher probability of being a debtor; (ii) a JPY 0.10 
(=0.046∗2.12) million larger debt amount of respondents; and (iii) a JPY 0.12 (=0.046∗2.61) million larger 
debt amount of debtors. 
    Positive association between impatience (ρ) and debt holding (i.e., H3) can also be confirmed at high 
significance levels. With other personal attributes being equal, respondents who are less patient by one unit 
of standard deviation than the average: (i) are debtors with a 5.4 (or 5.5) percentage-point higher 
probability in model (A) (or (B)); and (ii) have a JPY 0.22 (or 0.23) million larger amount of debt in model 
(A) (or (B)) for the debtor sample. 
    As predicted by H4, the respondents' debt holding has strong negative correlations with the incidence 
of the sign effect. The probability of respondents who are not subject to the sign effect being indebted is 
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6.3 (6.1) percentage-points higher than the corresponding probability of those who are subject to the effect 
in model (A) (or (B)). The marginal effects of the absence of the sign effect on the debtors' debt amounts 
are JPY 0.26 million for model (A) and JPY 0.27 million for model (B). Borrowing aversion associated 
with the sign effect is so strong that all of the estimated marginal effects of the absence of the sign effect 
are larger than the marginal effects of one-standard-deviation increase both in α and ρ. 
 
4.2.2. Debt purposes 
 
We also estimate the probability functions of debt holding for various purposes. The results are 
summarized in panel B of Table 4. As the proportion of borrowers for each specific purpose is small (at 
most 8% from Table 1), the estimation results are not so strong as those for overall debt. However, the sign 
conditions predicted from H1 through H4 are met in almost all cases. Although it seems difficult to find 
out strong tendency from the results, it might be noteworthy that declining impatience is significant for 
debts for cars and amusements whereas it is not for living costs and business. To be rough, the effect of 
present bias seems to occur more clearly for debt holding which is less closely related to subsistence. 
 
4.2.3. Inclination toward overborrowing 
 
We detect for the marginal effects of the three time-discounting variables (α, ρ, θ) on the respondents' 
inclination toward overborrowing. To do so, we estimate probit models for the probabilities of: displaying 
a debt-to-income ratio being higher than 30%; having credit-card debts; having the experience of borrowed 
unsecured consumer loans; having the experience of having been denied a loan; and the experience of 
having engaged in debt-restructuring or of declared personal bankruptcy. 
    Table 5 summarizes the results. Consistent with hypothesis H2, an increase in declining impatience α 
is shown to lead naïve respondents to have stronger inclination to overborrow. It is valid in almost all cases 
at high significance levels. For example, naïve respondents whose α is higher by one unit of standard 
deviation (0.046) are 2.31 (=4.6∗0.503) percentage-points more likely to have credit-card debts. The 
marginal effect is more than one fourth of the prevalence rate of credit-card debtors (8.6% from Table 1). 
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    In contrast, as expected by hypothesis H3, the sophisticated respondents does not show significant 
association between declining impatience and overborrowing inclination, except for the case of the default 
experience (debt restructuring or personal bankruptcy). Sophisticated respondents with a higher degree of 
declining impatience are less likely to have the default experience. The result is somewhat puzzling and 
might be hard to understand theoretically. 
 
Insert Table 5. 
 
    For all cases, overborrowing inclination is highly correlated with impatience ρ. For model (A) (or (B)), 
an increase in ρ by one standard deviation is associated with a 2.5 (or 2.4) percentage-point higher 
probability of exhibiting higher debt-to-income ratios than 30 %. The marginal effect is not that small 
when compared with the corresponding unconditional probability, 8.1% (see Table 1): the marginal effect 
relative to the unconditional probability amounts to 30.9%. The marginal effect on the probability of 
having credit-card debts is 2.2 percentage points for model (A) and 1.9 percentage points for (B), which 
are around one fourth of the unconditional probability (8.6%). The marginal effects on the probability of 
having ever borrowed unsecured consumer loans are around 1%. 
    As for the sign effect, expected negative association is observed for the probability of exhibiting 
higher debt-to-income ratios than 30%: the incidence of the sign effect is associated with a 3.2 
percentage-point decrease in the probability, which is greater in magnitude than the marginal effect of 
one-standard-deviation increase both in α and ρ. However, association with the other overborrowing 
variables are not detected. 
 
5. Discussions 
 
For robustness check, we re-examine the above analysis in two ways. Firstly, we re-conduct regression 
using as a regressor a binary indicator for the present-biased respondent (α>0), instead of declining 
impatience α. This enables us to focus on the effect of having present-biased preferences under a weaker 
condition. Secondly, to rule out the possibility that the above results simply reflect that responses 
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indicative of declining and/or low impatience are a consequence of overborrowing rather than the cause of 
it, we conduct the same regression as in the previous section by excluding from the sample any respondent 
who could be taken as seriously credit-constrained. 
 
5.1. Regressions with the present-bias dummy 
 
In the previous section, we have estimated the generalized hyperbolic discount function, which enables us 
to detect the marginal effect of a parametric increase in the degree of declining impatience on borrowing 
behavior. However, the results may depend on the specification of the discount function. To focus on the 
effect of the incidence of present bias on borrowing behavior by giving up detecting the effect of 
differences in the degree of declining impatience αί, let us use for a regressor the binary indicator, instead 
of αί , which equals one if the respondent is present biased (αί >0) and zero otherwise. 
    Table 6 summarizes the results, where in the column of "Present bias (α>0) =1" the marginal effects 
compared with the case without present bias are shown. The results are consistent with our hypotheses and 
the results of Table 4 in the previous section. In particular, naïve respondents are 4.7 percentage-points 
more likely to have debt, and have a JPY 0.11 million larger amounts of debt, than respondents without 
present bias, whereas there is no significant difference both in the probability of being indebted and the 
amounts of debt holding between sophisticates with present bias and respondents without present bias. 
 
Insert Table 6. 
 
    The marginal effects on overborrowing inclination are summarized in Table 7. Except for that the 
marginal effects of the incidence of present bias on the probability of having the experiences of having 
borrowed unsecured consumer loans are insignificant, the results are consistent in that the naïve are more 
likely to overborrow. 
 
Insert Table 7. 
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    The result on credit-card debts is comparable with that of Meier and Sprenger (2010), which reports 
that the presence of present bias leads to a 16 percentage-point increase in the probability of having 
credit-card debts. In Table 7, the corresponding marginal effect of the presence of present bias amounts to 
4.8 percentage points for naïve respondents and 3.1 percentage points for average respondents. Although 
the effects are much smaller than Meier and Sprenger's estimate, the relative magnitudes to the prevalence 
rate of credit-card debtors (i.e., the unconditional probability of having credit card debts), i.e., 38.4% 
(=4.8/12.5) for naïve respondents and 36.0% (=3.1/8.6) for average respondents, are just as high as the 
corresponding ratio that is computed from Meier and Sprenger's estimate (16/41=39.0%).16 
 
5.2. Excluding credit-constrained respondents 
 
It should be noted that the observed association between time discounting and debt holding could be 
interpreted as that overborrowing causes high and/or declining impatience: Credit-constrained respondents 
with excessive debt might be likely to choose smaller amounts of money with front-end delay to pay off 
outstanding debt and/or live on today, which may lead them to reveal high discount rates and cause 
positive association between debt and impatience. When the credit problem is very serious, the respondents 
might be much more impatient in immediate future choices than in distant future choices, which may lead 
them to reveal declining impatience and cause positive association between debt and declining impatience. 
    To consider this problem, recall first that in Questions Q1 and Q2, from which we estimate the degree 
of declining impatience, the smaller amount of money with front-end delay is set to JPY1,000 (around 
USD12.3). It might not be a plausible interpretation to take that intertemporal choices of such small money 
are strongly affected by their credit conditions unless the respondents face such a serious financial 
difficulty that they hardly live on the current week or month. 
    Given our data restriction, one possible way to check the robustness against the problem of our main 
results above is to reestimate equations by excluding credit-constrained respondents from the sample. To 
do it, we exclude from the sample any respondent with a credit problem or a troubled credit history who 
                                                  
16 As seen by comparing the log pseudolikelihood values of Tables 4 and 6, the regression model with αί 
fits better than the model with the present bias dummy, especially for the overall debt holding. 
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has borrowed to pay off other debts; has the experiences of having denied a loan for whatever reason; or 
has the experiences of having engaged in debt restructuring or declared personal bankruptcy. The number 
of the respondents excluded amounts to 280. 
    Table 8 shows the results. Our main results, the validity of hypotheses H1 through H4, are shown to 
be robust for overall debt behavior captured by the probability of being a debtor and by the amount of debt 
holding. Although the results for the overborrowing inclination become somewhat weaker, the coefficients 
of the degree of declining impatience are significant for the probability of exhibiting a debt-to-income ratio 
higher than 30% and that of having credit-card debts. It is also confirmed that less patient respondents are 
more likely to have credit-card debts. In this sample, however, the probability of having the experiences of 
having borrowed unsecured loans does not have significant correlation with any time discounting 
variables.17 
 
Insert Table 8. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
We have shown that consumers' borrowing behavior have expected correlations with time discounting, 
including decision biases such as hyperbolic discounting and the sign effect. Although these time 
discounting variables have been often emphasized in theory as important determinants of indebtedness, 
empirical examination has not been conducted in a direct way. By identifying naïve and sophisticated 
respondents, our study has quantified substantial positive associations of (over-)indebtedness with 
hyperbolic discounting and impatience, and substantial negative correlations with the sign effect. 
    Three novelties are there. Firstly, respondents preferences are parameterized by using the generalized 
hyperbolic discount function, so that the elicited degree of declining impatience is used to detect 
                                                  
17 We also estimated debt holding equations by excluding from the sample respondents whose 
debt/income ratios are greater than 30% as credit-constrained respondents. The results are again supportive 
of our results obtained in the previous section regarding overall debt holding as well as overborrowing 
inclination. 
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association between the degree of present bias and debt holding behavior. Secondly, we try to distinguish 
naïve and sophisticated respondents by using self reporting data on the gap between plan and actual 
behavior over onerous assignments. Thirdly, borrowing aversion associated with the sign effect, i.e., the 
gain-loss asymmetry in time discounting, is also detected. 
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Appendix A: An illustrative model 
     
    In this appendix, we illustrate theoretically relations between declining impatience and borrowing 
behavior of the naïve and the sophisticated using a simple three-period model. Consider a hyperbolic naïve 
consumer in the three period setting. Let cτ and u(cτ) denote period-τ consumption the period utility 
function, respectively. The gross rate of interest R is constant. In the initial period 1, the naïve consumer 
determines his "optimal" consumption c1 from the intertemporal optimality conditions, 
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where W1 is initial wealth holding. As 1+α > (1+2α)/(1+α), the conditions imply that the consumer puts a 
greater weight on the immediate gratification from c1 than he expects to put on the period-2 immediate 
gratification from c2. Since this tendency is stronger with α, a larger α results in larger debt holdings in the 
period. 
    In period 2, the naïve consumer re-determines (c2, c3) from the the period-2 optimality condition, 
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which differs from the period-1 condition (4): gratification from c2 is evaluated more highly than in (4). 
The realized c2 is thus larger than the level which was planned in the previous period, whereas the opposite 
is true for c3. 
    To be more specific, if u(cτ) is specified by the power function, 
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the naïve consumer's "optimal" consumption rates are given by 
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1111 Wc
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where W2N is wealth in period 2, R(W1-c1N); and λ11and λ22 represent the realized marginal propensities to 
consume (MPC) in periods 1 and 2, respectively: 
{ } { } γγλ /122/1111 )2()1(1
1
fRRRfR −− ++
= ,                     (9) 
{ } γλ /1122 )1(1
1
RfR−+
= .                                    (10) 
From these solutions, as ƒ(τ)’ s are decreasing in α, a large α implies a large c1N and a small c3N.18 In this 
sense, naïve consumers with stronger declining impatience are likely to hold larger debts. 
    When the consumer is a sophisticate, who expects correctly the incidence of the preference reversal 
from (4) to (5), he first solves (5) for (c2, c3) by taking c1 and hence period-2 wealth W2 as given. Once the 
optimal c2 and c3 are obtained as functions of c1, by substituting functions c2(c1) and c3(c1) into the lifetime 
utility maximization problem, the consumer determines the optimal c1 and hence c2 and c3. 
    In the illustrative model, the sophisticate's optimal consumption ctS in period t is obtained as 
1111 Wc
S λ′= ,                                      (11) 
SS Wc 2222 λ= ,                                     (12) 
SS RWc 2223 )1( λ−= ,                               (13) 
where W2S=R(W1- c1S); and the MPC λ'11 in period 1 is defined in the same way as in (9) by using effective 
discount factors ƒS(τ) (τ=1,2), instead of ƒ(τ): 
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    The solution differs from the naïve consumer's solution only in the MPC in period 1: it is defined by 
                                                  
18 The effect of an increase in α on c2 are ambiguous because it raises the marginal propensity to consume 
from W2 whereas it reduces W2 by raising c1. 
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using the effective discount factors ƒS(τ), instead of ƒ(τ). The effective discount factor ƒS(1) for period 2 is 
a weighted average of the corresponding original discount factor ƒ(1) and the original future one-period 
discount factor for period 3 computed as ƒ(2)/ƒ(1). Since, as is easily seen, ƒS(1)>ƒ(1) and ƒS(2)>ƒ(2), 
which means that the sophisticate behaves as if he had a lower discount rate when comparing felicities 
from c1 and c2 and a higher discount rate when comparing felicities from c2 and c3 than he would if he 
were naïve. Due to these opposite effects, it is theoretically ambiguous whether the sophisticated 
consumer's MPC in period 1 (λ'11) is smaller than the naïve one's (λ11).19 
    Nevertheless, it may be natural to hypothesize that the sophisticated consumer would weaken 
somehow overconsumption/undersaving and overborrowing because period-1 self has an incentive to use 
some devices to commit to his lifetime consumption plan. In fact, when there is an commitment device, the 
period-1 self commits to his lifetime consumption plan which is obtained from (3) and (4) (not (5)), so that 
the sophisticate's solution can be shown to satisfy: 
NS cc 11 = , 
NS cc 22 < , and 
NS cc 33 > , with commitment devices 
meaning that the sophisticate restrains c2S, and mitigates undersaving and/or overborrowing.20 
 
     
                                                  
19 As shown in the literature (e.g., Phelps and Pollack, 1968; Laibson, 1996; and O'Donoghue and Rabin, 
1999), the solution of the naive and that of the sophisticated coincide when the relative risk aversion γ 
equals one, i.e., when the felicity function is logarithmic. We can verify that our solutions satisfy the same 
property. 
20 From (3), (4), and the lifetime budget, the solution with commitments are obtained as c2S =λ21RW1 and 
c3S =(1-λ11-λ21)R2W1, where λ11 is given by (9); and 
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From this and (8), it can be shown that, with commitment devices, c3S - c3N ∝ ƒ(2) 1/γ- ƒ(1) 2/γ>0. 
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Appendix B: Questions in Q1 and Q2 
 
Insert Figure A1. 
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Appendix C: Q6 and its payoff table 
 
Q6.  Suppose you have two options to pay some money. You may choose Option "A", to 
pay JPY 1 million today; or Option "B", to pay a different amount in a year. Compare the 
amounts and timing in Option "A" with Option "B" and indicate which amount you would 
prefer to pay for each of all 9 choices. 
 
Option A - paying today   A B   Option B - paying in a year 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY 920,000 (USD11,344) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY 970,000 (USD11,961) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY1,001,000 (USD12,343) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY1,005,000 (USD12,392) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY1,010,000 (USD12,454) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY1,050,000 (USD12,947) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY1,100,000 (USD13,564) 
JPY1,000,000 (USD12,330)  □ □  JPY1,300,000 (USD16,029) 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics
Panel A. Background attributes Mean (S.D.)
Age 41.763 (12.46) 
Male 0.499 (0.50) 
University grad. 0.546 (0.50) 
Household income (in JPY million) 6.90 (4.09) 
Household's financial assets (in JPY million) 14.53 (23.67) 
Household's real assets (in JPY million) 21.15 (29.54) 
Panel B. Debt-related attributes
Debtors 0.202 (0.40) 
Debt amounts (in JPY million) 0.50 (0.17) 
Debt amounts when debtor=1 (in JPY million) 2.45 (0.32) 
Debt for:
Cars 0.066 (0.25) 
Other goods 0.080 (0.27) 
Living costs 0.041 (0.20) 
business 0.017 (0.13) 
Amusements 0.016 (0.13) 
Paying off other debt 0.020 (0.14) 
Debt-to-income ratio > 0.3 0.081 (0.27) 
0.086 (0.28) 
0.087 (0.28) 
0.118 (0.32) 
0.021 (0.14) 
2345
2386
2361
2386
2386
2386
2386
483
2386
2386
2351
Having credit-card debts
2364
2386
2386
2386
2386
Note : Data source: The original internet survey, The Japan Internet
Survey on Preferences Relating To Time and Risk 2010 (JPTR
2010). Mortgage loans are excluded fron debt.
N
Having experiences of having engaged in debt
restructuring or declared personal bankruptcy 2378
Having experiences of having been denied a
loan for whatever reason 2386
2386
Having experiences of having borrowed
unsecured consumer loans 2386
Table 2.
Generalized hyperbolic discounting, the sign effect, and impatience. 
Panel A. Generalized hyperbolic discount function
α 0.018 (0.001) 0.025 (0.003) 0.016 (0.001)
Declining impatience (α>0) ? 
Intercept  α*η 0.050 (0.001) 0.065 (0.004) 0.046 (0.002)
ρ(7) ((1)) 0.039 (0.001) 0.049 (0.002) 0.037 (0.001)
ρ(372) ((2)) 0.029 (0.001) 0.032 (0.003) 0.028 (0.001)
Panel B. Implied discount rates from Q5 and Q6
Discount rates for: receipts Q5 ((3)) 0.088 (0.004) 0.120 (0.009) 0.079 (0.004)
payments Q6 ((4)) 0.010 (0.002) 0.027 (0.005) 0.005 (0.002)
The sign effect ((3) > (4)) ?
Panel C. The degree of impatience
Impatience ρ (standardized average of (1)-(4)) -0.007 (0.014) 0.159 (0.034) -0.048 (0.015)
Yes Yes Yes
Yes
Note: Standard errors in paretheses.  See equations (1) and (2) for the meanings of parameters α, η, andρ. * All the 'Yes's represent that the differences are
significent with P-values smaller than 0.000. ** 'Insignificant' represents that the corresponding P-value equals 0.15.
Yes
Discount rates Yes
Insignificant**
Yes
Yes
All Debtors Non-debtors Debtor's > Non-debtor's ?
Declining impatience Yes*
Yes Yes Yes
Table 3
Summary statistics stratified by time discounting variables.
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) χ2 statistics Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) χ2 statistics Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) χ2 statistics
(P-value) (P-value) (P-value)
Panel A. Background attributes
Age 45.68 (12.44) 44.1 (12.65) 39.26 (11.87) 198.84 45.15 (12.32) 40.32 (12.19) 116.69 41.82 (12.51) 41.72 (12.09) 39.47
(0.00) (0.00) (0.70) 
Male 0.516 (0.50) 0.521 (0.50) 0.472 (0.50) 4.61 0.578 (0.49) 0.463 (0.50) 25.67 0.501 (0.50) 0.486 (0.50) 0.3
(0.10) (0.00) (0.58) 
University grad. 0.523 (0.50) 0.531 (0.50) 0.541 (0.50) 1.10 0.498 (0.50) 0.55 (0.50) 6.08 0.528 (0.50) 0.56 (0.50) 1.63
(0.58) (0.01) (0.20) 
Household income (in JPY million) 7.00 (4.32) 7.26 (4.11) 6.75 (3.97) 29.59 6.71 (4.15) 7.00 (4.07) 17.44 6.91 (4.09) 6.94 (4.15) 4.13
(0.13) (0.10) (0.97) 
Household's financial assets (in JPY million) 13.08 (22.17) 16.22 (23.03) 14.86 (24.62) 29.64 13.96 (24.69) 15.01 (23.43) 31.81 14.31 (23.26) 16.32 (26.07) 10.80
(0.04) (0.00) (0.29) 
Household's real assets (in JPY million) 22.46 (28.98) 24.93 (31.57) 19.52 (29.31) 36.13 21.35 (30.55) 21.48 (29.59) 12.43 21.01 (29.29) 23.28 (32.24) 8.11
(0.01) (0.19) (0.52) 
Panel B. Debt-related attributes
Debtors 0.238 (0.43) 0.203 (0.40) 0.181 (0.38) 8.25 0.277 (0.45) 0.162 (0.37) 39.76 0.189 (0.39) 0.234 (0.42) 4.37
(0.02) (0.00) (0.04) 
Debt amounts (in JPY million) 0.58 (1.83) 0.45 (1.50) 0.48 (1.81) 32.29 0.73 (2.08) 0.37 (1.50) 45.63 0.43 (1.59) 0.69 (2.13) 18.7
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) 
Debt amounts when debtor=1 (in JPY million) 2.45 (3.08) 2.21 (2.68) 2.63 (3.55) 23.24 2.63 (3.27) 2.28 (3.09) 5.09 2.28 (3.03) 2.96 (3.58) 12.66
(0.06) (0.65) (0.08) 
Debt for:
Cars 0.064 (0.25) 0.076 (0.26) 0.059 (0.24) 1.35 0.087 (0.28) 0.054 (0.23) 8.79 0.056 (0.23) 0.1 (0.30) 11.09
(0.51) (0.00) (0.00) 
Other goods 0.106 (0.31) 0.073 (0.26) 0.071 (0.26) 6.81 0.117 (0.32) 0.062 (0.24) 20.58 0.076 (0.26) 0.09 (0.29) 1.01
(0.03) (0.00) (0.32) 
Living costs 0.071 (0.26) 0.029 (0.17) 0.032 (0.18) 17.49 0.064 (0.24) 0.025 (0.16) 20.75 0.034 (0.18) 0.051 (0.22) 2.85
(0.00) (0.00) (0.09) 
business 0.019 (0.14) 0.018 (0.13) 0.014 (0.12) 0.93 0.033 (0.18) 0.01 (0.10) 15.04 0.017 (0.13) 0.019 (0.13) 0.07
(0.63) (0.00) (0.79) 
Amusements 0.031 (0.17) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 12.85 0.027 (0.16) 0.011 (0.10) 8.47 0.016 (0.12) 0.016 (0.13) 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.93) 
Loan repayment 0.023 (0.15) 0.01 (0.10) 0.021 (0.14) 2.12 0.027 (0.16) 0.016 (0.12) 3.35 0.018 (0.13) 0.025 (0.16) 1.11
(0.35) (0.07) (0.29) 
Debt-to-income ratio > 0.3 0.104 (0.31) 0.089 (0.28) 0.068 (0.25) 7.30 0.117 (0.32) 0.062 (0.24) 20.58 0.073 (0.26) 0.104 (0.31) 4.81
(0.03) (0.00) (0.03) 
0.125 (0.33) 0.073 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26) 16.22 0.125 (0.33) 0.064 (0.24) 24.12 0.081 (0.27) 0.091 (0.29) 0.43
(0.00) (0.00) (0.51) 
0.109 (0.31) 0.081 (0.27) 0.072 (0.26) 5.01 0.127 (0.33) 0.065 (0.25) 18.96 0.085 (0.28) 0.081 (0.27) 0.12
(0.08) (0.00) (0.73) 
0.163 (0.37) 0.104 (0.31) 0.101 (0.30) 15.75 0.165 (0.37) 0.09 (0.29) 27.69 0.114 (0.32) 0.111 (0.31) 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.89) 
0.033 (0.18) 0.01 (0.10) 0.019 (0.14) 6.33 0.038 (0.19) 0.013 (0.11) 16.25 0.021 (0.14) 0.019 (0.14) 0.10
(0.04) (0.00) (0.75) 
Note : Mortgage loans are excluded from debt. Bold digits for χ2 statistics represent the significance at the 10 % level.
N N
703 1588
576 384 1317 703 1588
Impatience (ρ) Sign effects (θ)
α>0
α≦0 ρ>mean ρ≦mean θ=1 θ=0χ2 test χ2 testNaif Sophisticate
576 384 1317
Declining impatience (α)
N N N
1859 432
576 384 1317 703 1588 1859 432
1564 1825
1859 432
565 381 1307 693 1574 429
426
562 382 1299 692 1566
560 380 1298 687
N
1832 426
N
1838
576 384 1317 703 1588
576 384 1317 703 1588
137 78 238 195 258 352
1317 703 1588 1859
χ2 test
1859 432
101
4321859
432
576 384 1317 703 1588 1859 432
576 384
1859 432
576 384 1317 703 1588 1859
1317 703 1588 1859
432
576 384 1317 703 1588
432
576 384 1317 703 1588 1859 432
576 384
Having credit-card debts
566 381 1308 694 1576 1840 430
Having experiences of having borrowed
unsecured consumer loans 576 384 1317 703 1588 1859 432
576 384 1317 703 1588 1859 432
702 1584
Having experiences of having been denied a loan
for whatever reason 576 384 1317 703
1856 430
1588 1859 432
Having experiences of having engaged in debt
restructuring or declared personal bankruptcy 575 384 1310
Table 4
The marginal effects of time discounting on debt holding behavior. 
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Regresson methods
Panel A. Overall debt holding
*** 0.054 *** -0.063 *** -1030.81 2245 Binary probit
(4.45) (-2.80)
0.780 *** 0.203 0.055 *** -0.061 *** -966.72 2139 Binary probit
(3.58) (0.79) (4.52) (-2.71)
** 0.18 *** -0.23 *** -3948.54 2245 Interval tobit
(4.64) (-3.06)
2.12 *** 0.37 0.19 *** -0.24 *** -3700.62 2139 Interval tobit
(3.66) (0.42) (4.75) (-3.04)
*** 0.22 *** -0.26 *** -3948.54 2245 Interval tobit
(4.76) (-3.25)
2.61 *** 0.46 0.23 *** -0.27 *** -3700.62 2139 Interval tobit
(3.71) (0.42) (4.88) (-3.23)
Panel B. Debt purposes
Prob. of having debts for:
*** 0.011 -0.053 *** -495.49 2245 Binary probit
(1.72) (-3.45) 　
0.212 * 0.256 ** 0.010 -0.048 *** -498.2 2139 Binary probit
(1.86) (2.11) (1.59) (-3.20)
0.017 *** -0.017 -571.12 2245 Binary probit
(2.72) (-1.30)
0.143 -0.013 0.018 *** -0.021 -540.12 2139 Binary probit
(1.37) (-0.09) (2.88) (-1.58)
0.003 -0.008 -308.22 2245 Binary probit
(1.36) (-1.36)
0.059 -0.065 0.003 -0.008 -292.9 2139 Binary probit
(1.40) (-1.01) (1.32) (-1.31)
0.006 *** -0.002 -172.21 2245 Binary probit
(2.94) (-0.39)
0.035 0.031 0.005 ** -0.003 -156.92 2139 Binary probit
(1.08) (0.65) (2.54) (-0.67)
0.002 -0.000 -160.69 2245 Binary probit
(1.28) (-0.01)
0.054 ** -0.014 0.002 0.001 -140.13 2139 Binary probit
(2.16) (-0.37) (1.02) (0.18)
Sophisticates
Note : The estimated marginal effects are listed with z values in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, education, household
income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Amusements (A) 0.038
(1.72)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Business
(A) 0.022
(0.78)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Living costs
(A) 0.026
(1.03)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Other goods 
(A) 0.066
(0.80)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
 Cars
(A) 0.218
(2.56)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Debt amounts in the debtor
sample (in JPYmillion) (A)
1.48
(2.59)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Debt amounts (in JPYmillion)
(A) 1.22
(2.58)
(B)
Naifs
Declining impatience（α） Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
Prob. of being a debtor
(A) 0.454
(2.83)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Table 5
The marginal effects of time discounting on overborrowing inclination. 
Probability of: Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Regresson methods
0.025 *** -0.032 ** -581.95 2245 Binary probit
(3.52) (-2.16)
0.309 ** 0.009 0.024 *** -0.033 ** -550.5 2139 Binary probit
(2.56) (0.05) (3.40) (-2.19)
*** 0.022 *** -0.016 -612.48 2245 Binary probit
(3.02) (-1.08)
0.503 *** -0.151 0.019 *** -0.014 -572.45 2139 Binary probit
(4.07) (-0.85) (2.61) (-0.92)
* 0.010 *** -0.001 -414.29 2245 Binary probit
(2.61) (-0.07)
0.179 *** -0.024 0.009 ** -0.003 -527.87 2245 Binary probit
(2.65) (-0.27) (2.40) (-0.33)
** 0.032 *** -0.007 -721.78 2245 Binary probit
(3.80) (-0.42)
0.458 *** -0.111 0.027 *** -0.002 -684.05 2139 Binary probit
(3.12) (-0.52) (3.11) (-0.13)
0.005 ** -0.000 -197.79 2240 Binary probit
(2.37) (-0.02)
-0.010 -0.247 * 0.003 * -0.001 -179.13 2134 Binary probit
(-0.43) (-1.76) (1.83) (-0.27)
Note : The estimated marginal effects are listed with z values in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, education, household
income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Sophisticates
Having experiences of
having engaged in debt
restructuring or declared
personal bankruptcy
(A) -0.035
(1.06)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Having experiences of
having been denied a loan
for whatever reason
(A) 0.236
(2.05)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Having experiences of
having borrowed unsecured
consumer loans
(A) 0.098
(1.83)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Having credit-card debts
(A) 0.278
(2.77)
(B)
Naifs
Declining impatience（α） Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
Debt-to-income ratio > 30%
(A) 0.142
(1.49)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Table 6
The marginal effects on debt holding: Estimation with the present bias dummy. 
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Regresson methods
Panel A. Overall debt holding
** 0.056 *** -0.063 *** -1032.07 2245 Binary probit
(4.72) (-2.81)
0.047 ** 0.013 0.059 *** -0.061 *** -970.79 2139 Binary probit
(2.29) (0.56) (4.87) (-2.69)
0.19 *** -0.23 *** -3950.81 2245 Interval tobit
(4.86) (-2.99)
0.11 * -0.01 0.20 *** -0.23 *** -3704.62 2139 Interval tobit
(1.76) (-0.15) (5.03) (-2.95)
0.23 *** -0.26 *** -3950.81 2245 Interval tobit
(5.00) (-3.17)
0.14 * -0.01 0.25 *** -0.26 *** -3704.62 2139 Interval tobit
(1.78) (-0.15) (5.18) (-3.14)
Panel B. Debt purposes
0.013 ** -0.051 *** -497.81 2245 Binary probit
(2.02) (-3.36) 　
0.006 0.001 0.012 * -0.046 *** -461.18 2139 Binary probit
(0.54) (0.76) (1.91) (-3.05)
0.017 *** -0.018 -570.40 2245 Binary probit
(2.78) (-1.40)
0.022 * 0.002 0.019 *** -0.023 * -538.76 2139 Binary probit
(1.92) (0.13) (2.99) (-1.70)
0.003 -0.008 -307.45 2245 Binary probit
(1.37) (-1.36)
0.009 -0.002 0.004 -0.008 -291.42 2139 Binary probit
(1.58) (-0.38) (1.36) (-1.34)
0.006 *** -0.002 -172.45 2245 Binary probit
(2.92) (-0.33)
0.001 -0.000 0.006 ** -0.003 -157.55 2139 Binary probit
(0.15) (-0.04) (2.56) (-0.56)
* 0.003 -0.000 -159.14 2245 Binary probit
(1.43) (-0.10)
0.008 ** 0.001 0.002 0.000 -139.40 2139 Binary probit
(1.98) (0.32) (1.26) (0.05)
Sign effect (θ)
Prob. of being a debtor (A) 0.038
(2.20)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
0.07
(1.27)
(B)
Naifs
Present bias (α>0) = 1 Impatience (ρ)
Sophisticates
Debt amounts in the debtor sample
(in JPYmillion) (A)
0.08
(1.28)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Debt amounts (in JPYmillion) (A)
Naifs Sophisticates
Prob. of having debts for:
 Cars (A) 0.013
(1.29)
(B)
Naifs
0.004
(1.31)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Other goods (A) 0.013
(1.38)
(B)
Sophisticates
Business (A) 0.001
(0.25)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Living costs (A)
Sophisticates
Note : The estimated marginal effects are listed with z values in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, education, household income,
household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Amusements (A) 0.007(1.83)
(B)
Naifs
Table 7
The marginal effects on overborrowing inclination: Estimation with the present bias dummy. 
Probability of: Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Regresson methods
* 0.026 *** -0.034 ** -581.46 2245 Binary probit
(3.64) (-2.23)
0.025 * 0.013 0.026 *** -0.034 ** -551.75 2139 Binary probit
(1.85) (0.91) (3.61) (-2.22)
*** 0.023 *** -0.018 -612.28 2245 Binary probit
(3.30) (-1.17)
0.048 *** 0.004 0.022 *** -0.016 -574.26 2139 Binary probit
(3.45) (0.25) (3.02) (-1.07)
0.011 *** -0.000 -415.09 2245 Binary probit
(2.80) (-0.05)
0.009 0.006 0.011 *** -0.002 -384.99 2245 Binary probit
(1.26) (0.75) (2.71) (-0.22)
* 0.033 *** -0.007 -722.41 2245 Binary probit
(4.04) (-0.43)
0.040 ** -0.003 0.029 *** -0.004 -685.27 2139 Binary probit
(2.59) (-0.19) (3.42) (-0.24)
0.005 ** -0.001 -198.18 2240 Binary probit
(2.35) (-0.14)
0.003 -0.006 0.004 ** -0.002 -179.11 2134 Binary probit
(1.07) (-1.36) (1.98) (-0.43)
Note : The estimated marginal effects are listed with z values in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, education, household
income, household real asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Sophisticates
Having experiences of having
engaged in debt restructuring or
declared personal bankruptcy
(A) 0.001
(0.32)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Having experiences of having
been denied a loan for whatever
reason
(A) 0.022
(1.68)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Having experiences of having
borrowed unsecured consumer
loans
(A) 0.009
(1.36)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Having credit-card debts
(A) 0.031
(2.68)
(B)
Naifs
Present bias (α>0) = 1 Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
Debt-to-income ratio > 30%
(A) 0.019
(1.67)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Table 8
The marginal effects of time discounting on debt holding and overborrwoing inclination: Credit-constrained respondents excluded from the sample.
Model Log pseudolikelihood #obs Regresson methods
Panel A. Overall debt holding
* 0.040 *** -0.040 * -819.77 1965 Binary probit
(3.25) (-1.80)
0.670 *** 0.015 0.042 *** -0.040 * -769.25 1876 Binary probit
(2.83) (0.06) (3.34) (-1.81)
0.11 *** -0.15 ** -2884.94 1965 Interval tobit
(3.11) (-2.06)
1.95 *** -0.39 0.12 *** 0.15 ** -2710.33 1876 Interval tobit
(2.94) (-0.53) (3.20) (-2.08)
0.16 *** -0.19 ** -2884.94 1965 Interval tobit
(3.15) (-2.17)
2.69 *** -0.54 0.17 *** -0.20 ** -2710.33 1876 Interval tobit
(2.97) (-0.53) (3.25) (-2.20)
Panel B. Overborrowing inclination
Prob. of: 
0.011 -0.020 -407.42 1965 Binary probit
(1.58) (-1.44)
0.350 *** -0.078 0.012 -0.023 -386.96 1876 Binary probit
(2.89) (-0.49) (1.64) (-1.62)
0.015 ** -0.004 -433.21 1965 Binary probit
(2.13) (-0.27)
0.376 *** -0.151 0.015 ** -0.004 -406.94 1876 Binary probit
(3.02) (-0.94) (2.10) (-0.28)
0.004 0.003 -227.63 1965 Binary probit
(1.11) (0.52)
0.054 0.027 0.003 0.001 -205.88 1876 Binary probit
(0.99) (0.39) (0.91) (0.21)
Sophisticates
Note : In regressions, any respondent with a credit problem or a troubled credit history (having borrowed to pay off other debts, having the experience of having engaged in
debt restructuring or declared personal bankruptcy, or having the experience of having been denied a loan for what ever reason) is excluded from the sample. The estimated
marginal effects are listed with z values in parentheses. Control variables include: the degree of risk aversion, age, gender, education, household income, household real
asset holding, household financial asset holding. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Having experiences of having
borrowed unsecured consumer
loans
(A)
0.020
(0.45)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Having credit-card debts
(A) 0.142
(1.48)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Debt-to-income ratio > 30%
(A) 0.146
(1.59)
(B)
Naifs
Sophisticates
Debt amounts in the debtor sample
(in JPYmillion) (A)
0.97
(1.49)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
Debt amounts (in JPYmillion)
(A) 0.71
(1.48)
(B)
Naifs
Declining impatience（α） Impatience (ρ) Sign effect (θ)
Prob. of being a debtor
(A) 0.283
(1.71)
(B)
Naifs Sophisticates
0.06
Declining discount rates under generalized hyperbolic discounting.
Figure 1 
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Note: The schedules depict discount rates ρ=αη/(1+ατ) of average respondents, average debtors, and average non-debtors, where the (α, η) values are the sample means of the 
corresponding samples: (0.018, 2.842) for average respondents;  (0.018, 2.240) for average debtors; and (0.016, 2.938) for average non-debtors. 
Figure A1
Questions to elicit the generalized hyperbolic discount factor.
Q1 (Questions on discount rates for immediate future) Q2 (Question on discount rates for distant future)
Which one do you prefer? Choos one you prefer. Which one do you prefer? Choos one you prefer.
(A) To get JPY 1,000 today. (A) To get JPY 1,000 a year later.
(B) To get JPY 3,000 a week later. (B) To get JPY 3,000 a year + a week later.
(A) To get JPY 1 000 today (A) To get JPY 1 000 a year later
Q1-2-1 Q2-2-1
    ,  .     ,    .
(B) To get JPY 2,000 a week later. (B) To get JPY 2,000 a week later.
(A) To get JPY 1,000 today. (A) To get JPY 1,000 a year later.
(B) To get JPY 1,700 a week later. (B) To get JPY 1,700 a year + a week later.
(A) To get JPY 1,000 today. (A) To get JPY 1,000 a year later.Q1-1 Q2-1
Q1-2 Q2-2
Q1-2-2 Q2-2-2
(B) To get JPY 1,500 a week later. (B) To get JPY 1,500 a year + a week later.
(A) To get JPY 1,000 today. (A) To get JPY 1,000 a year later.
(B) To get JPY 1,400 a week later. (B) To get JPY 1,400 a year + a week later.
(A) To get JPY 1,000 today. (A) To get JPY 1,000 a year later.
(B) To get JPY 1,300 a week later. (B) To get JPY 1,300 a year + a week later.
Q1-3-1 Q2-3-1
Q1-3 Q2-3
(A) To get JPY 1,000 today. (A) To get JPY 1,000 a year later.
(B) To get JPY 1,200 a week later. (B) To get JPY 1,200 a year + a week later.Q1-3-2 Q2-3-2
